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This paper investigates a new class of 2-player games in continuous time, in which
the players' observations of each other's actions are distorted by Brownian motions.
These games are analogous to repeated games with imperfect monitoring in which
the players take actions frequently. Using a dierential equation we nd the set E(r)
of payo pairs achievable by all public perfect equilibria of the continuous-time game,
where r is the discount rate. The same dierential equation allows us to nd public
perfect equilibria that achieve any value pair on the boundary of the set E(r): These
public perfect equilibria are based on a pair of continuation values as a state variable,
which moves along the boundary of E(r) during the course of the game. In order
to give players incentives to take actions that are not static best responses, the pair
of continuation values is stochastically driven by the players' observations of each
other's actions along the boundary of the set E(r):1
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11 Introduction.
This paper analyzes a new class of two-player games in continuous time that are related
to repeated games with imperfect monitoring (i.e. imperfectly observable actions). In
these continuous-time games players do not see each other's actions directly; they only
see signals that are distorted by Brownian motions. We are interested in the set of payo
pairs that can be achieved in an equilibrium of the entire game. The benet of modeling
dynamic interactions as continuous-time games lies in the clarity with which the set of
equilibrium payos can be characterized. The continuous-time approach also allows for a
simple description of equilibrium strategies that achieve the extreme points of the set of
equilibrium payos.
We study public perfect equilibria (PPE) and the set of payo pairs that can be achieved
by PPE in a game with imperfectly observable actions. This set of payo pairs is denoted by
E(r) for a discount rate r: A PPE is a pair of strategies that depend only on the commonly
observable public outcomes such that each player's strategy is a best response after all
public histories. The purpose of this paper is not to prove a Folk Theorem for this class of
games, but to precisely characterize the set E(r) as well as public perfect equilibria.
It turns out that the boundary of the set E(r) can be found using an ordinary dierential
equation, which we call the optimality equation. The optimality equation also allows us
to construct equilibria that achieve any payo pair on the boundary of the set E(r): The
dynamics of such equilibria are based on a pair of continuation values as a state variable,
which moves along the boundary of the set E(r) during the course of the game. At any
moment of time, a player's continuation value is his future expected payo in the remaining
game. The current continuation values determine the players' actions and the impact of
observed signals on motion of continuation payos.
The optimality equation relates incentives, the equilibrium motion of continuation val-
ues, and the geometry of the set E(r): In equilibrium, a player's incentives stem from the
in
uence of the signal about his actions on his future continuation values. The player's
actions are optimal when they maximize his instantaneous payo 
ow plus the expected
rate of change of his continuation value. Because signals are stochastic, so is the motion
of continuation values. The optimality equation, shown informally on the third panel of
Figure 1, ties together four measures:
1. ineciency, how much continuation values v fall behind the 
ow of payos g(a)
2. incentives, the sensitivity of continuation values towards public signals
23. the amount of noise in signals
4. the curvature of the set E(r):
We see that noise, curvature, and the necessity to provide incentives contribute posi-
tively to ineciency. In equilibrium, as continuation values move on the boundary of the
set E(r); the tangent line gives the ratio at which players can instantaneously transfer fu-
ture equilibrium payos in order to create incentives. Because of the curvature of the set
E(r) players cannot transfer utility between each other indenitely at the same constant
rate. Curvature, together with the magnitude of noise in the public signal, quanties the
informational ineciency.2 The greater the curvature, the more costly it is to provide in-
centives and the greater should be the dierence between the continuation values and the

ow of payos.
The optimality equation also assigns an equilibrium action pair a to each point v on
the boundary of the set E(r): That action pair optimally resolves the trade-o between
ineciency and incentives to stretch the boundaries of the set E(r) as far out as possible.
This paper contributes to the theory of repeated games with imperfect monitoring,
which has been developed by Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990), hereafter APS, and
Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994), hereafter FLM. Specically, continuous-time games
illustrate the pattern of equilibrium dynamics in such games and clearly outline the trade-
os involved in the choice of equilibrium actions. The contributions of APS, FLM, and
continuous-time games are illustrated in three panels of Figure 1, in which the horizontal
and vertical axes represent the players' payos.
APS investigate sequential equilibria of repeated games with imperfect monitoring.
These games have a great multiplicity of equilibria. APS make the problem of nding
equilibrium payos much more manageable. They show that any equilibrium payo vector
can be achieved by a recursive equilibrium, in which the players' continuation values are
state variables. In equilibrium continuation values change location after every observation
of the public signal. The arrows in the left panel of Figure 1 illustrate the potential jumps
of continuation values after dierent signals. The challenge behind our understanding of
discrete-time games is that it is dicult to see a pattern behind these jumps and the
connection between the equilibrium dynamcis and the shape of the set of equilibrium pay-
os. Continuous-time games illuminate the connection between the equilibrium motion of
2As noise increases, the variance of continuation values necessary to provide incentives increases. Be-
cause of the curvature of E(r); that increases ineciency.
3continuation values, incentives, and the shape of the set E(r): In particular, the optimality
equation leads naturally to a simpler computational procedure in a continuous-time setting.
FLM show that under appropriate conditions the Folk Theorem holds for repeated
games with imperfect information: any smooth convex payo set W inside the set V of
all feasible and individually rational payos can be achieved in equilibrium as long as the
players are suciently patient. The key insight behind FLM's proof of the Folk Theorem
is to consider a specic pattern of the motion of continuation values. Specically, any
payo pair v on the boundary of W is achievable if the future continuation values (denoted
by w; w0 and w00 in the middle panel of Figure 1) are chosen on a tangent line. The
continuous-time setting allows us to do more: for any discount rate r we can characterize
the optimal equilibrium motion of continuation values. It turns out that this motion stays






















Figure 1: Illustration of the methods of APS, FLM and this paper.
One may be surprised that the informational problem persists in our continuous-time
setting. After all, if players can change their actions fast, why can they not instantaneously
punish all deviations? A critical feature of our model is that while the players can adjust
their actions as quickly as they want, the faster they react, the less information they
observe. This feature is in a sharp contrast with the model adopted in FLM, where as the
duration of a period is shrunk to 0, the amount of information that the players learn per
period nevertheless remains the same. This issue was addressed by Abreu, Milgrom and
Pearce (1991) in a model with Poisson arrival of signals.3
3Also, Kandori (1992) shows that the set of payos achieved in PPE increases in the accuracy of
monitoring.
4Brownian motion was rst applied to the problem of dynamic incentive provision in
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987). Their paper is a good example that in some situations a
continuous-time formulation allows us to better recognize patterns and prove clean results.
The information 
ow in our paper is similar to Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) in the
sense that players learn about each other's actions from a continuous process with i.i.d.
increments.4
Simon and Stinchcombe (1989) illustrate a lot of diculties associated with the model-
ing of games in continuous time. For example, a simple description of a strategy in discrete
time often has no equivalent in continuous time. These diculties arise when the actions
of one player instantaneously create information available to his opponent. This issue is
not a problem in our framework. In our continuous-time games, information is dened
exogenously in terms of all possible signals, and a strategy of a player simply denes a
probability measure over all possible signals.
Recently, a number of authors have enriched the problem of optimal incentive provision
in a dynamic setting using the mathematical tools of optimal control of diusion processes.
Sannikov (2004) and Williams (2004) both introduce a new method of analyzing the in-
formational problem in a dynamic principal-agent relationship. In both models, the agent
drives a stochastic state X with his choice of controls, but the agent's choice is not directly
observable. 5 Both papers analyze models with one-sided imperfect information, where
only the agent takes hidden actions. This paper extends the continuous-time method to a
two-sided setting, where both players take hidden actions.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides two motivating examples. Section
3 formally describes the class of continuous-time games analyzed in this paper. Section
4 describes several standard game-theoretic concepts in our setting: the stage game, the
minmax payo and the sets of unconstrained payos and Nash equilibrium payos. Section
5 identies incentive compatibility conditions, discusses the concept of a continuation value,
and describes PPE in terms of the stochastic motion of continuation values. Section 6
interprets this description of PPE as a stochastic control problem and characterizes the
set E(r) as well as PPE that achieve its extreme points. Section 7 summarizes the main
4We do not allow statistically meaningful jumps in the players' observations, as in the Poisson model
of Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991). As a result, the noise has the form of a Brownian motion.
5Williams (2004) characterizes the optimal contract with a partial dierential equation based on the
following state variables: time, state X; the agent's value, and possibly other variables in an enriched
formulation. In Sannikov (2004) the optimal contract can be derived using an ordinary dierential equation
based on a single state variable, the agent's continuation value.
5results and provides an intuitive discussion of public perfect equilibria. Section 8 presents
computational techniques and examples. Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 Examples.
In this section, we illustrate continuous-time games and the results of this paper with
two examples. Each game is dened by the matrix of expected payos of a stage game
and the noise structure. Players continuously take actions at each time t 2 [0;1); but
they do not directly observe each other's past actions. Instead, players publicly observe
random processes that carry some information about their past actions. This information
is obscured by noise. Specically, player i's actions determines the drift of the publicly
observed process Xi: Here are the two examples:
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Figure 2: Matrix of Static Payos and Set E(r) in Partnership.
Noisy Partnership/Prisoners' Dilemma. Two players participate in a joint venture
in continuous time. Each player has a set of actions A1 = A2 = f0;1g; where 0 means
\no eort" and 1 means \eort." The action of player i = 1;2 at time t is denoted by Ai
t:

















s ds + Z
2
t ;
6where Z1 and Z2 are independent standard Brownian motions. The increments of the
process Xi re
ect how much the actions of player i contribute to the success of the joint
venture. Players enjoy the success of their joint venture, but they dislike eort. The actual





















































g1(a1;a2) = 2a2   a1 and g2(a1;a2) = 2a1   a2:
Static payo functions g1 and g2 give the expectation of the rates at which the players







































Figure 3: Sample Paths of Continuation Values.
To give a taste of our results, Figure 2 also shows a computed set E(r) for r = 0:2:
7Let us discuss an equilibrium that achieves payo pair C on the boundary of the set E(r):
During the equilibrium play, the pair of continuation values follows a diusion process on
the boundary of E(r); driven by the realizations of X: The pair of continuation values has
a drift and a volatility. The tangential component of the drift is shown in Figure 2: it
is directed away from points A; C and E; towards points B; D; and the origin. Players
choose their eort levels depending on the current pair of continuation values as shown in
Figure 2. Both players put eort on the thick portion of the boundary of E(r):
Figure 3 gives three sample paths of the players' continuation values in the equilibrium
that achieves payo pair C: The vertical axis represents the boundary of E(r); denoted by
@E(r); with points A; B; C; D and E clearly marked.
In Figure 3, the drift of continuation values is directed away from the solid horizontal
lines, towards the dotted lines. The dotted lines represent the boundaries, where one of
the players switches from eort to no eort. Because of the drift pattern, players typically
spend considerable amounts of time in \unequal" regimes, where one player puts eort and
the other alternates between eort and no eort. These regimes are denoted by (1/0,1) and
(1,1/0) in Figure 3. The realizations of X cause players to switch from one unequal regime
to another, until they become absorbed in the static Nash equilibrium, in which players
stop putting eort. We see from Figure 3 that the collapse into Nash equilibrium is fast
because the drift towards the Nash equilibrium point becomes stronger as the continuation
values approach that point.
Duopoly with Dierentiated Products. Consider two rms, whose products are
imperfect substitutes. The private actions of rm i are supply rates from set Ai =
f0;1;2;3;4;5;6;7;8;9;10g: The instantaneous prices of rms 1 and 2 are given by the
increments of the processes
dP
1




t) dt + noise and dP
2




t) dt + noise:
Prices are publicly observable, and the noise structure is such that rms can isolate a signal





t   dP 1
t + 10 dt = A1
t dt + dZ1
t
dX2
t = dP 1
t   dP 2
t + 5 dt = A2
t dt + dZ2
t
where Z1 and Z2 are independent standard Brownian motions. The payos of rms 1 and


















The payo functions can be identied as
g1(a1;a2) = a1(25   2a1   a2) and g2(a1;a2) = a2(30   2a2   2a1):
This stage game has a unique Nash equilibrium (5;5); but ideally rms could collude by
producing (4;4): The PPE of this game are described in Section 8.2.
3 The Setting.
Time t 2 [0;1) advances continuously. At every moment of time t; players i = 1;2 choose
actions Ai
t from nite sets Ai: Players do not see each other's actions directly, but publicly
observe the path of a d-dimensional public signal Xt that depends on the players' actions
and noise. When players i = 1;2 take actions Ai = fAi





(As) ds + dZt;
where As = (A1
s;A2
s) and Z is a d-dimensional Brownian motion. A strategy of player i is
public if his action at time t is determined by the public history, which consists of the signals
fXs;s 2 [0;t]g and possibly other public information introduced for public randomization.
Formally, public information is captured by a ltration fFtg:
Each player receives a 
ow of payo discounted at a common rate r; which depends on his
action and the public signal, but not directly on his opponent's action. The instantaneous
payo of player i at time t is given by ci(Ai
t)dt+bi(Ai
t)dXt for some functions ci : Ai ! <
and bi : Ai ! <d: Since Xt has drift (At); player i's expected payo 






Denition. A pair of public strategies A = (A1
t;A2
t; 0  t < 1) is a perfect public
equilibrium (PPE) if for i = 1;2 Ai maximizes the expected discounted payo of player i
given the strategy Aj of his opponent after all public histories.
Formally, the expected discounted payo (a.k.a. continuation value) of player i after a












where the expectation is conditioned on the public information at time t:
In the next sections we characterize the set E(r) of payo pairs achievable by all PPE
and pay special attention to the PPE that achieve extreme value pairs of the set E(r):
We nd that the equilibrium actions in those PPE are essentially unique and that those
PPE do not use public randomization. The equilibrium dynamics are described in terms of
the stochastic motion of continuation values on the boundary of E(r) driven by the public
signals.
Games with Product Structure.
Some characteristics of our equilibria, especially the provision of incentives, are easier
to understand within the context of a subclass of these games that has product structure.
In this class the set of actions of each player is one-dimensional and (a1;a2) = (a1;a2);
i.e. each player's action aects a separate signal, and the two signals are independent. The
examples from the previous section are all from this class. After we derive our results in a
general setting, we discuss incentives in equilibria of the games from this class in the end
of Section 7.
4 Important Sets.
Let us review several concepts that are familiar from the theory of repeated games. A
stage game G has the set of players N = f1;2g; an action set of each player Ai and payo
functions gi:
G = fN;(Ai)i2N; (gi)i2Ng:
Denote the set of all action proles of the stage game G by A = A1  A2; and the set of
pure strategy Nash equilibria, by AN  A: Let N be the convex hull of all pure strategy
Nash equilibrium payo pairs of game G; and V; the convex hull of all feasible payo pairs:
N  co f(g1(a);g2(a)) j a 2 A
Ng V  co f(g1(a);g2(a)) j a 2 Ag:






Player i can guarantee himself his pure strategy minmax payo for any strategy of the
opponent. Dene by
V
  fv 2 V j vi  vi for i = 1;2g;
the subset of V on which each player receives at least his minmax payo.
Due to the possibility of public randomization, the set E(r) of payo pairs achievable
by all PPE is convex. As in repeated games in discrete time, we have
N  E(r)  V
  V;













Figure 4: Sets N; E(r); V and V for the Noisy Partnership with r = 0:2:
Remark. The reason why player i can guarantee himself a pure-strategy minmax
payo of vi is that the strategies of both players must be public, i.e. adapted to the public
11ltration fFtg: We can imagine an alternative formulation, in which each player's strategy
is adapted to his private ltration fFi
tg and the public ltration satises Ft  F1
t \ F2
t :
Under this alternative formulation, there may be equilibria that are not public, and the
achievable payo set may be larger than E(r): Kandori and Obara (2003) show that the use
of private strategies can improve equilibrium payos even in games with public monitoring.
However, to defend PPE, it can be shown that if player i follows a public strategy then
player j has a best response that is also a public strategy.
5 Properties of Continuation Values in PPE.
In this section, we characterize public perfect equilibria in terms of the stochastic properties
of the continuation values W 1
t (A) and W 2
t (A): Our analysis proceeds as follows. We start
with the denition of a player's continuation value: it is his future expected equilibrium
payo after a given public history. As time passes and the history unfolds, the continu-
ation values change: they will move in the set E(r): In a public perfect equilibrium this
motion is determined by the public information: the signals Xt and public randomization.
Proposition 1 represents the relationship between public information and the motion of
continuation values formally, and shows that this motion must satisfy a promise keeping
condition. This condition relates a player's current continuation value, his current payo

ow and the expected change of his continuation value.
Next, we nd that incentives come from the relationship between the public signals
and the motion of continuation values. A player may have incentives to take an action
dierent from a static best response because (1) actions aect public signals, and (2)
public signals aect future continuation values. Proposition 2 provides an instantaneous
incentive compatibility condition. The analogue of this condition in a discrete-time game
is that a deviation for one period is not protable. Proposition 2 proves that a strategy of
player i is optimal in response to the strategy of his opponent at all times if and only if
the instantaneous incentive compatibility condition always holds. Together, Propositions 1
and 2 show that in any PPE, the motion of continuation values must satisfy two conditions:
promise keeping and incentive compatibility. Propositions 2 and 3 imply the converse: if
the motion of two random processes satises these conditions, then there is a PPE in which
these random processes are continuation values. Theorem 1 summarizes these results of
this section.












First, we need a representation that identies the drift of W i(A) and the sensitivity of
W i(A) to Xi:
Proposition 1. (Representation and Promise Keeping). Player i's continuation
value has drift r(W i















s  (dXs   (As)ds) +  
i
t; (4)
where i = (i1 :::id) are chosen so that  i
t is a martingale orthogonal to X:
This proposition formalizes the fact that the path of player i's continuation value is
determined by public information: the signal X and a public randomization process  : The
vector of coecients i
t captures the exposure of player i's continuation value to dXt: The





t(A)   gi(At)) dt + r
i
t  (dXt   (As)dt) + d 
i
t:
It can be interpreted as an instantaneous regression of dW i
t(A) onto a constant and dXt;
with a regression error d i
t:
Note that r(gi(At) W i
t(A)) is the drift of player i's continuation value. Figure 5 shows
this intuitively from the fact that Wt(A) is a weighted average of the current payo 
ow
g(At) and expected continuation values an instant later. Thus, we call the condition that
W i
t(A) has drift r(gi(At)   W i









dt ; where hW i(A);Xki is called the cross-variation between
W i(A) and Xk: Then  i; dened by (4), is orthogonal to X: Also note that
V
i















 rtgi(At) dt   re
 rtW
i




which proves that r(W i
t(A) gi(At)) is the drift of W i
t(A); so  i in representation (4) must
be a martingale.
The process i represents the extent, to which player i's value is driven by the public
signal X: Therefore, i is responsible for player i's incentives, as shown below:
Proposition 2. (Incentive Compatibility). Strategy Ai of player i is optimal in re-




i; gi(At) + 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holds for all t: Therefore, a pair of strategies A is a PPE if and only if (5) holds for both
players.
Let us interpret the incentive compatibility condition. Suppose that player i is contem-
plating a deviation to an alternative action a0










t is the sensitivity of player i's continuation value towards dXt;




t) (At)): If the incentive










t)   (At))  0: (6)
Therefore, condition (5) states that an instantaneous deviation is not protable.
In the proof of Proposition 2, we show that instantaneous incentive compatibility implies
full incentive compatibility. Instantaneous losses from deviations integrate to a loss globally.
14Proof. Let us nd the payo to player i from an alternative strategy ^ Ai: If player i follows
strategy ^ Ai until time t and then switches back to Ai; he gets
V
i














We can use (4) to derive that
dV
i
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where we used the fact that Xt has drift ( ^ Ai
t;A
j
t) and  i
t is a martingale.
If condition (5) holds for all t; then W i
0( ^ Ai;Aj)  W i
0(A) and player i does not have a
protable deviation at time 0. By a similar argument, player i will not have a protable







t) for all t: Then, W i
0( ^ Ai;Aj) > W i
0(A) and Ai is not
an optimal response to the strategy Aj:
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To characterize the set E(r) in the next section we need to:
(1) be able to show that some value pairs cannot be achieved in equilibrium.
15(2) be able to construct PPE that achieve value pairs in our conjectured set E(r):
For (1), we can rely on the restrictions on the motion of continuation values from Propo-
sitions 1 and 2. These restrictions are promise keeping, which determines the drift of
continuation values, and incentive compatibility, which determines their volatility. For (2),
we prove a result converse to Propositions 1 and 2: if a pair of strategies A = (A1;A2)
together with a pair of random processes W = (W 1;W 2) satisfy promise keeping and in-
centive compatibility, then W are continuation values and A is a PPE. This result allows
us to construct PPE by dening the motion of a state variable, a pair promised values W;
with an appropriate drift and volatility. Proposition 3 assures us that if the drift of W i
accounts for promise keeping then W i coincides with player i's true continuation value.
Proposition 3. (Promise Keeping). Consider a pair of strategies A: Suppose W i is a










s   gi(As)) ds + ~ W
i
t (9)
for some martingale ~ W i
t: Then W i
t equals to player i's true continuation value W i
t(A):
Proof. It follows that W i
t = W i




















coincide. First note that both V i
t and V i
t (A) are martingales. Indeed, using (9), dV i
t =
e rtd ~ W i
t; so V i is a martingale. From (3), V i
t (A) is also a martingale because
V
i







These martingales converge as t ! 1 because both e rtW i
t and e rtW i
















If continuation values under the strategy pair A satisfy the incentive compatibility
16condition, then Proposition 2 already guarantees that A is a PPE. We summarize our
characterization of PPE in the following theorem:
Theorem 1. Characterization of PPE. In any PPE A; the pair of continuation values
W is a process in V that satises
Wt = W0 + r
Z t
0
(Ws   g(As)) ds + r
Z t
0





(i)   is a 2-dimensional martingale orthogonal to X and
(ii) Bt enforces action pair At for all t
Conversely, if W is a bounded 2-dimensional process that satises equation (10) for A;
B and   that satisfy properties (i) and (ii), then W is a pair of continuation values in public
perfect equilibrium A:
Therefore, E(r) is the largest subset of V such that a controlled process W; given by
(10) can be kept in the set E(r) by controls A; B and   that satisfy conditions (i) and (ii)
starting from any point W0 2 E(r):
The last part of the Theorem formulates the problem of nding the set E(r) as a problem
from optimal stochastic control. We will use this result to characterize the set E(r) and
PPE that achieve extreme points of the set E(r) in the next section.
6 PPE with Extreme Values: Derivation.
In this section, we use the characterization of PPE from Theorem 1 to describe the set E(r)
by an ordinary dierential equation and nd PPE that achieve extreme points of E(r): First,
we informally describe the results that are derived further in the section. Then, to highlight
the game theoretic intuition and to keep technicalities in the background, we derive our
main result under the assumption that E(r) is a compact set with a piecewise continuous
curvature. In the Appendix we modify our argument to prove the result without the prior
assumptions of compactness and dierentiability.
176.1 Informal Discussion.
Let us review the properties of PPE from the previous section, and then introduce the main
results of this section about the geometry of the set E(r) and PPE that achieve extreme
value pairs of E(r): According to Theorem 1, E(r) is the largest subset of V such that the
process
Wt = W0 + r
Z t
0
(Ws   g(As)) ds + r
Z t
0
Bs dZs +  t (11)
can be kept in the set E(r) by an appropriate choice of controls. We have the freedom to
choose actions A; volatilities B that enforce those actions, and public randomization  : If
the initial value pair W0 is inside the set E(r); this freedom gives a lot of room for very
many equilibria. However, if the initial value pair W0 is an extreme point of the set E(r);
the choice of controls is severely restricted because continuation values cannot escape from
the set E(r): In fact, we will show that in an equilibrium that achieves an extreme value
pair of the set E(r)
(a) future continuation values Wt must be extreme points of E(r)
(b) there is no public randomization, i.e.   = 0
(c) the span of Bt is in the tangential direction to the set E(r) at point Wt at all times
(d) the choice of At and Bt is generically unique at all times
(e) if there are static Nash equilibrium payo pairs on the boundary of E(r); players are
eventually absorbed in a static Nash equilibrium with probability 1.
We should point out that the spirit of properties (a)-(e) is present in the existing literature
on repeated games. However, in discrete time these properties hold only under special
continuity assumptions or in approximation. In relation to (a) and (b) in discrete time,
one can always choose extreme continuation values if there is public randomization. With-
out public randomization, APS show that future continuation values can be chosen to be
extreme points of the equilibrium value set if the distribution of signals is non-atomic.
Moreover, under certain analyticity conditions, future continuation values have to be ex-
treme. The property (c) that Bt must have a tangential span is related to FLM's concept
of enforceability of action pairs on tangent hyperplanes that is used to prove the Folk
Theorem. Although this has not been demonstrated formally, one has a sense that having
continuation values on tangent hyperplanes is required for a Folk Theorem. (For example,
18the Folk Theorem fails for Green and Porter type of equilibria that have two regimes and
do not involve continuation values on tangent lines.) Point (d) holds only under very strict
continuity assumptions (e.g. the analyticity assumptions of APS that guarantee that con-
tinuation values must be extreme points). For point (e) if there is a unique way to support
any extreme value pair, extreme Nash equilibrium payo pairs must be absorbing states.
However, in discrete time it should be possible for continuation values to never reach an
absorbing state.6
Even though the spirit of properties (a)-(e) is present in discrete-time games, it is
dicult to formalize them. However, they come out cleanly in our setting.
Besides proving (a)-(e) we also derive an ordinary dierential equation for the boundary
of set E(r); which we call the optimality equation. This equation connects the geometry of
the boundary with the equilibrium actions and the stochastic motion of continuation values,
and can be used for computation. To understand this equation, we must rst provide an
analogue of FLM's concept of enforceability on tangent hyperplanes in our setting:
Denition. A 2  d matrix B enforces action pair a 2 A on tangent T = (t1;t2) if B
is of the form






for some  2 <d: Let A(T) be the set of action pairs that are enforceable on tangent T: Of
all vectors  such that T enforces a 2 A(T); let (a;T) be the one of the smallest length.
Here is the optimality equation:
(w) = max
a2A(T(w))nAN
2(g(a)   w)  N(w)
rj(a;T(w))j2 ; (12)
where (w); N(w) and T(w) are the curvature and unit normal and tangent vectors at
point w on the boundary of the set E(r); and jj denotes the length of vector :
We derive these results in next subsection.
6.2 Derivation.
In this subsection we assume that the set E(r) is compact and has piecewise continuous
curvature, and derive a characterization of this set and of PPE that achieve its extreme
6See Hauser and Hopenhayn (2004) for a continuous-time example with Poisson signal arrival, in which
continuation values never reach static Nash equilibria.
19value pairs. The compactness and dierentiability of E(r) are justied in the Appendix.
Let us brie
y outline our derivation. We nd that whenever a pair of continuation values
Wt is an extreme point of E(r); the trajectories of continuation values must be tangential
to the boundary of E(r): The normal component of the drift of Wt causes these trajectories
to be locally bent (see Proposition 4.) The natural curvature of the trajectories depends
on the drift and volatility of Wt; which are determined by the equilibrium actions. We
show that at extreme value pairs Wt the equilibrium actions and volatilities that enforce
them must satisfy the constraint that the natural curvature of continuation values cannot
be smaller than the curvature of E(r) : otherwise continuation values would escape from
E(r): In optimal equilibria this constraint is binding, and thus the equilibrium actions to
achieve extreme payo pairs are generically unique. The optimality equation (12) connects
the curvature of E(r) with the equilibrium choice of actions.
Let us go through the details of our argument. Recall that the motion of continuation
values is described by
dWt = r(Wt   g(At)) dt + rBt dZt + d t (13)
We can immediately make two observations about this motion for those times t (including
t = 0) when Wt  is an extreme point of the set E(r):7 First, matrix Bt must have span
in the tangential direction to the set E(r) at point Wt : Indeed, a normal component of
volatility would instantaneously throw future continuation values outside the set E(r) with
positive probability. Second, there is no public randomization at moment t because an
extreme value pair cannot be represented as a convex combination of other points in E(r);
so Wt  = Wt:8 Since matrix Bt has a tangential span, we can represent it as Bt = T(Wt)t;
where T(Wt) is a unit tangent vector at point Wt 2 ext E(r) and t 2 <d:
It turns out that when the span of Bt 6= 0 is focused along one line, the trajectories of
continuation values become locally bent with a curvature that depends on the drift of Wt:
This property, which is formalized in the next proposition, will help us write an equation
that connects the geometry of the set E(r) with the stochastic motion of continuation
values.
Proposition 4. Suppose that Wt is on the curve C; and that Bt = Tt where the unit
7Wt  denotes a pair of continuation values at time t immediately before public randomization.
8One can object that we proved only that public randomization in the form of a jump is impossible. This
is enough, because continuous public randomization can be done using an extra uninformative dimension
of Z:
20vector T is tangent to C at point Wt; and N is an outward unit normal vector. Let (;f())
be a parameterization of C in normal and tangential coordinates and let
Dt+ = N  Wt+   f(T  Wt+):
Then D has volatility zero and drift
















Figure 6: The denition of Dt+:
To interpret the proposition, note that Dt+ is related to the distance from Wt+ to the
curve C; as illustrated in Figure 6. If At = 2 AN and
 =
2(Wt   g(At))  N
rjtj2
then dDt = 0: In this case, we call  a curvature of enforcement of action pair At at Wt on
tangent T: 10
9Curvature is the rate at which the tangential angle changes with arc length.
10An action pair a 2 A(T)nAN usually has many curvatures of enforcement at w on tangent T: The
21Proof. By projecting equation
dWt = r(Wt   g(At)) dt + rTt dZt: (14)
onto the tangent axis we get
d(T  Wt) = r(Wt   g(At))  T dt + rt dZt (15)
Using Ito's Lemma,











By projecting (14) onto the normal axis we get
d(Wt  N) = r(Wt   g(At))  N dt: (17)
Combining (16) and (17) we get the desired result
dDt = d(Wt  N   f(T  Wt)) =






Using Proposition 4 we can characterize the curvature (w) of the set E(r) at any point
w 2 ext E(r)nN by equation (18) below. We do it in two steps.
First, suppose Wt(A) = w 2 ext E(r)nN: We claim that action pair At cannot be a
static Nash equilibrium and must have a curvature of enforcement   (w) Indeed, if
At 2 AN then the drift of continuation values at time t is directed outside E(r) as shown
in the left panel of Figure 7. If At = 2 AN and  < (w) then by Proposition 4, the drift
of the distance from Wt to the set E(r) would be positive, as shown in the right panel of
Figure 7. In either case, continuation values instantaneously escape from E(r); which leads
to a contradiction.
Second we claim that a curvature of enforcement cannot be strictly greater than (w)
smallest one is
 =
2(w   g(a))  N
rj(a;T)j2 ;








Figure 7: Demonstrating that   (w):
for any a 2 A(T)nAN: Otherwise, informally speaking, value pair w could be achieved by
using action pair a at time 0 and continuation values on a curve with curvature  > (w);
which lie inside the set E(r); as shown in Figure 8. Inspecting the gure, we realize that we
must be able to achieve a value pair w + N outside the set E(r) by using the same action
pair and continuation values in the set E(r); which leads to a contradiction. Formally, this
is shown in Proposition 6.
From these two steps, we conclude that the curvature of E(r) satises the following
equation at all points w 2 ext E(r)nN :
(w) = max
a2A(T(w))nAN
2(g(a)   w)  N(w)
rj(a;T(w))j2 ; (18)
Dierent action pairs a 2 A(T(w))nAN can have dierent enforcement curvatures at w on
tangent T(w):11 The action pair (generically unique) with the largest enforcement curvature
is played at point w 2 ext E(r)nN:
Equation (18) does not completely characterize the set E(r) yet, because there may be
many sets that satisfy (18) at all extreme points that are not in N: We need to add some
nishing touches to our derivation, i.e.
(a) prove that all points w = 2 N on the boundary of E(r) are extreme
(b) show that E(r) is the largest set whose boundary satises (18) outside N and
(c) formalize the argument behind Figure 8.










Figure 8: Demonstrating that the curvature of enforcement cannot be greater than (w):
Proposition 5 plays several roles to provide nishing touches: it implies (b) directly, and it
is a building block to show (a) and (c).
Proposition 5. Suppose that the curve C satises equation (18). Furthermore, suppose
that either C is a closed curve, or has endpoints achievable by some PPE. Then C  E(r):
Proof. By Theorem 1, to achieve W0 2 C in a PPE it is sucient to construct a bounded
process Wt that satises
Wt = W0 + r
Z t
0
(Ws   g(As)) ds + r
Z t
0
Bs dZs; Bt enforces At (19)
for all t: Denote by a : C ! AnAN the maximizer in (18). Let Wt; t   be a process that
 starts at W0
 stays on C until a stopping time  when Wt hits an endpoint of C (where  = 1 if C
is a closed curve)
 has tangential drift r(Wt  g(At))T(Wt) and volatility rT(Wt)(At;T(Wt)); where
At = a(Wt):




= r(Wt   g(At))  N(Wt)
until time : Let us extend process W beyond time  by letting it follow the path of a
PPE that achieves value W: Then W becomes a bounded random process that satises
equation (19) until time 1: By Theorem 1, we found a PPE that achieves W0:
Proposition 5 implies that if the boundary of any set W satises equation (18) at all
points outside N; then W  E(r): We can also use Proposition 5 to formalize the argument
behind Figure 8.
Proposition 6. Let w = 2 N be a point on the boundary of E(r): Then there is no action
pair a = 2 AN; for which
(w) <
2(g(a)   w)  N(w)
rj(a;T(w))j2 : (20)
Proof. Suppose not. Then the curve C that solves equation (18) from initial conditions
(w;T(w)) has greater curvature at w than the boundary of E(r); as shown in Figure 8.
This means that C enters the interior of E(r) around point w: From the continuity of the
solutions to (18) in initial conditions (see Appendix), the solution C0 from initial conditions
(w + N(w);T(w)) must enter the interior of E(r) as well. But then, by Proposition 5,
C0  E(r); a contradiction.
Corollary 1. Any point w = 2 N on the boundary of E(r) is extreme.
Proof. If not, then (w) = 0: There is no action pair a = 2 AN with (g(a) w)N(w) > 0 that
is enforceable on tangent T(w); because otherwise (20) holds. Point w must be contained
in a segment on the boundary of E(r) with extreme endpoints wL and wH: Without loss of
generality assume that wH = 2 N: If there was an equilibrium that achieved value wH; then
continuation values would escape from the set E(r) instantaneously due to drift if A0 2 AN
or tangential volatility if A0 = 2 AN; a contradiction.
This completes the derivation of our main result which is summarized at the next
section. The next section also provides an intuitive discussion of the set E(r) and PPE
that achieve extreme payo pairs.
257 The Main Section: Summary and Discussion.
The following theorem characterizes the set E(r) and the public perfect equilibria (PPE)
that achieve extreme value pairs of E(r):
Theorem 2. Characterization. E(r) is the largest closed subset of V with curvature
(w) = max
a 2 A(T(w))nAN
2 (g(a)   w)  N(w)
r j(a;T(w))j2 ; (21)
at all points w = 2 N on the boundary of E(r); where T(w) and N(w) are unit tangent and
outward normal vectors at w: We call (21) the optimality equation.12
PPE with extreme values. Denote by a : @EnN ! AnAN the maximizing action pairs
in equation (21), where @E(r) denotes the boundary of E(r): Any value pair W0 2 extE(r)
is achieved by a PPE with the following characteristics. The pair of continuation values
under this PPE satises the SDE












(dXs   As ds) (22)
until time  when Wt hits the set N: For t < ; the players take action pairs At = a(Wt):
After time ; the players follow a static Nash equilibrium with value W: When @E(r)\N =
;; then  = 1: Otherwise, players become absorbed in a static Nash equilibrium with
probability 1 in nite time.13
In the remainder of this section we discuss the implications of this result on various
questions of interest: the equilibrium dynamics, the nature of ineciency, the choice of
equilibrium actions and the provision of incentives.
12In our model, we normalized each component of the signal X to be independent of the others and have
volatility 1. Alternatively, if the players observed signals
dXt = (A1
t;A2
t) dt +  dZt;




2 (g(a)   w)  N(w)
r j(a;T(w))j2 ;
where (a;T) is dened the same way as before.
13There is a great multiplicity of equilibria that achieve non-extreme values. In those equilibria players
do not need to become absorbed in a static Nash equilibrium.
26Let us describe dynamics in a PPE that achieves an extreme value pair W0: As soon as
the game begins, the players' continuation values Wt start moving along the boundary of
the set E(r):14 This motion is a diusion process dened by equation (22). Point Wt plays
the role of a single state variable in this equilibrium. As a state variable, Wt determines
the actions which the players take in a given instant, and the law by which Wt itself
evolves based on the observations of signal X: If there are Nash equilibrium payo pairs on
the boundary of E(r); then a pair of continuation values must eventually hit one of them
with probability 1. When that happens, the players become absorbed in a static Nash
equilibrium forever. Of course, if all static Nash equilibrium payo pairs are inside the
set E(r); then players never become absorbed in a Nash equilibrium, and the motion of
continuation values never stops.
At times t <  before the players become absorbed in a static Nash equilibrium (if
ever), they choose action pairs At and receive the payo 
ow g(At) = 2 E(r): The pair of
continuation values Wt has drift directed away from point g(At) inside the set E(r): This
drift accounts for promise keeping: the current continuation value Wt is always a weighted
average of the current payo 
ow g(At) and the expected continuation value a momemt







Figure 9: The drift and volatility of continuation values.
It may seem surprising that the drift of continuation values is directed inside E(r) even
though continuation values stay on the boundary. We can reconcile these two facts as
follows: because continuation values diuse along the boundary due to tangential volatility
and because the boundary has curvature, the expectation of future continuation values
must be inside the set E(r):
14Typically, as in all our examples, the pair of continuation values will diuse along the entire boundary
of E(r); not just its Pareto ecient portion.
27The equilibrium actions pairs At come from the optimality equation (21). The objective
of this equation is to describe the largest set of payo pairs achievable in equilibrium.
The choice among action pairs involves a trade-o between the extremity of payos and
the incentives required to enforce them. The extremity of a payo pair is measured by
the payo gain in the direction of the normal vector (see the numerator of (21)). The
incentives are measured by the instantaneous tangential variance of continuation values
(see the denominator of (21)). An optimal action pair achieves the maximum in (21). This
action pair can be enforced by using continuation values on the boundary of E(r): If we
tried to enforce a suboptimal action pair, the required drift and tangential volatility of Wt
would take future continuation values outside E(r):
Let us discuss the provision of incentives. Before time ; actions At are not static
Nash equilibria, so players must have incentives to take actions that are not static best
responses. These incentives arise because actions aect the drift of the public signals,
which in turn aect continuation values. The volatility matrix in equation (22) is the
sensitivity of continuation values to the signal X: From Section 5 we know that player i
has incentives not to deviate from action pair At if his action maximizes the sum of his
instantaneous payo and the expected change of his continuation value, i.e.
gi(At) + 
i










t is row i of the volatility matrix at time t: In an equilibrium that achieves an
extreme payo pair, the volatility matrix must be of the form T(w)t to have a tangential
span. Generally, there could be many ways to enforce At on a tangent line, but only the
smallest tangential variance must be used in an equilibrium, for which W0 is extreme. In
our general setting, not all action pairs can be enforced on all tangent lines so the Folk
Theorem may fail.
7.1 Incentives in Games with Product Structure.
The provision of incentives is especially clear in a special subclass of games with product
structure that was outlined in the end of Section 3. For that class of games A1; A2  <;
the public signal is two-dimensional and has drift (a1;a2) = (a1;a2): Therefore, there is a
separate signal that is indicative of each player's actions. The examples in Section 2 come
from this class of games.



























Here (t1;t2) denotes a unit tangent vector and the o-diagonal entries are determined
uniquely from the requirement that Bt has a tangential span. To enforce action pair At
with minimal volatility, we must choose ii
t of the smallest absolute value for (24) to hold.
Denition of 
: Consider all values of ii for which ai maximizes gi(ai;aj)+iiai given
aj: Of these values, dene 
i(ai;aj) to be the smallest in terms of absolute value. Note that





















Figure 10: How to nd 
:
Rates 
i can be computed very easily from gi; as illustrated in Figure 10. If we x aj
and plot gi(;aj); then  
i(ai;aj) equals the slope of function gi(;aj); between point ai
and the nearest protable deviation.
In terms of 















We can make several useful observations about incentive provision for the games of this
paper in general, and for this specic class with product structure.
29 Generally, because the local motion of continuation values is restricted to a tangent
line, the necessity to provide incentives to one player aects the continuation value of
another player. In this smaller class of games, player j's continuation value has sen-
sitivity 
i(At)tj=ti towards the signal Xi; which re
ects player i's action exclusively.
 If a game has product structure, then incentives provided to dierent players do not
interfere; there is a separate signal and a separate column of the matrix Bt that is
responsible for the actions of each player. In general this is not true because the same
signal can be aected by both players.
Let us comment on the enforceability of action pairs on tangent lines and the Folk
Theorem in this class of games. If gi is concave in ai; then 
i(a) is well dened for all
a 2 A and i = 1;2: Then all action pairs can be enforced on all tangent lines, except
for horizontal or vertical lines (because the o-diagonal entries of Bt may blow up.) On
horizontal lines we can enforce any pair of actions in which player 2 chooses a static best
response, including one that maximizes player 2's payo and one that minmaxes player 2.
A similar statement holds for vertical lines and player 1. For that reason, the Folk Theorem
holds.15 If the function gi is concave in ai for i = 1;2; the Folk Theorem may fail.
8 Computation.
In this section we discuss the computation of the set E(r); and present the outcomes of
computation in our two examples: noisy partnership and a duopoly with dierentiated
products.




2 (g(a) w())  N()
rj(a;T())j2 ;
(25)
where T() = ( sin;cos); N() = (cos;sin); and angle  parameterizes the curve.






15From the optimality equation we can see immediately that the Folk Theorem holds when 
i(a) is
dened for all i and a: Indeed, as r decreases to 0, the numerator 2(g(a) w)N in the optimality equation
also decreases to 0, making the set E(r) expand towards the boundaries of V:
30s:t: 8 a 2 A 8 i = 1;2 8 a
0
i 2 A
i; gi(a) + ti  (a)  gi(a
0
i;aj) + ti  (a
0
i;aj):











We can solve equation (25) numerically starting from any initial conditions (w;) 2 V 
[0;2): We present computation in our examples in an increasing order of diculty.
8.1 Noisy Partnership.
From symmetry considerations, the boundary of the set E(r) must contain a point on the
45-degree line with an outward unit normal N = (cos(45);sin(45)): Also, point (0;0)
will be on the boundary as well. For all points w on the line segment between the origin
and point (1;1); consider the curve C(w) that solves the optimality equation from initial
conditions (w;N): To compute the set E(r); we search along the 45-degree line and nd
point w; removed furthest from the origin, such that the curve C(w) reaches the origin.
First, we do a grid search to identify an interval where the desired point w is located. After
that, we do a binary search within the interval to compute w exactly. Figure 11 illustrates




















Figure 11: Computation of E(r) in Noisy Partnership.
From the grid search on Figure 11a, we know that there are two symmetric closed curves
31which satisfy the optimality equation everywhere except in the origin: one in the interval
(0:2;0:3); and one in the interval (0:8;0:9): We are interested in the latter curve, because
it is larger. That curve can be found by means of a binary search in the interval (0:8;0:9):
The computed boundary of E(r); along with recommended action pairs at every point,
is shown in Figure 11b.











Figure 12: Computation: an asymmetric game.
Computation for duopoly with dierentiated products is more dicult because it is
an asymmetric game and because the static Nash equilibrium payo is in the interior of
V: For this game the computational procedure is illustrated in Figure 12: We start at
an arbitrary point w1 on the boundary of the set V; and compute the solutions of the
optimality equation from initial conditions (w1;) for   : We raise  continuously, until
the corresponding solution C1 (for some angle ^ 1) hits point w1 after making a loop, as
shown in Figure 12a: We claim that the resulting solution must enclose the set E(r): If not,
as we vary  continuously between  to ^ 1; some solution would have to be tangent to E(r):
However, this is impossible, because then the solution would have to coincide with E(r)
(from the uniqueness of solutions given the initial conditions at the point of tangency).
Next, take point w2 on the curve C1 with an outward unit normal (1;0): Again, we
compute the solutions of the optimality equation from initial conditions (w2;) for   0:
We raise  continuously, until the corresponding solution C2 (for some angle ^ 2) hits point













































Figure 13: Set E(r) in Duopoly.
E(r) inside. By continuing this procedure iteratively, we will converge to the set E(r):
Figure 13 illustrates the outcome of computation for discount rate r = 1:5: The bound-
ary of E(r) is divided into many segments on which players keep their actions constant.
Figure 13 illustrates the general pattern of actions, as well as an interpretation of each
portion on the boundary of the set E(r):16 For comparison, recall that a static Nash equi-
librium is (5;5): Along the Pareto frontier of E(r); players collude by producing less than
their static best responses. We call this regime \market sharing." In this regime, when
a player's continuation value increases, his market share also increases. Therefore, play-
ers are rewarded for underproducing by an increased future market share. On top of the
set E(r); player 2 receives the maximal payo that he possibly could in a PPE. At that
point, player 1 produces very little, while player 2 produces close to his monopoly quantity.
While player 2 chooses a static best response, player 1 needs strong incentives to \stay
16I am thankful to William Fuchs for helping me nd these interpretations.
33out." To reward player 1 for \staying out," player 2 accommodates, and to punish player
1 for cheating, player 2 ghts. We call this regime \entrant and incumbent." On the left
side of E(r) player 1 is acting passively by producing a static best response, while player
2 is overproducing aggressively. At this point, player 2 is rewarded for overproducing by
being able to drive player 1 out of the market. We call this regime \contestability." At
the bottom left portion of E(r); players are ghting a \price war" by overproducing. They
have incentives to do so because the player that looks more aggressive will come out as a
winner of the price war. The winner gets his reward by becoming a monopolist for some
period of time.
9 Conclusion.
This paper introduces a new class of games in continuous time, in which the players' obser-
vations of each other's actions are distorted by Brownian motion. In these games, the set
of value pairs which are achievable in public perfect equilibria has a clean characterization.
The form of public perfect equilibria that achieve values on the boundary of the set E(r)
and the way by which the players organize the provision of incentives are intuitive. We
saw examples of various economic interactions that can be modeled as continuous-time
games. Besides our examples of a partnership and a duopoly, our model can be applied
to principal-agent problems, risk-sharing models, etc. One is hopeful that the simplicity
of characterizations in continuous-time models will allow deeper analysis of applications to
various dynamic incentive problems with imperfect information.
Let us discuss several questions for development of future theory. First, it is necessary to
illustrate the connection between discrete-time repeated games and continuous-time games
and to understand how continuous-time games can be used to approximate repeated games
in discrete time. Second, it is benecial to extend the continuous-time approach to games
with private information. DeMarzo and Sannikov (2004) show how to attack the issue
of private information in a setting with one-sided imperfect information. Third, one has
to extend the continuous-time approach to settings where more than one state variable is
required. Finally, it would be interesting to explore other computational procedures to nd
the set E(r):
34Appendix: Technical Details for Section 6.
Section 6 assumes that the set E(r) is compact and has a piecewise continuous curvature
in order to simplify the argument leading to our characterization of E(r): Here we explain
how to alter the argument to avoid these prior assumptions. We show that the set E(r)
is closed and that its boundary satises the optimality equation at all points, except for
those in N: To prove this, consider an arbitrary point w 2 @E(r)nN: We will show that a
tangent solution to the optimality equation through point w coincides with the boundary.
Therefore the boundary of E(r) has piecewise continuous curvature given by the optimality
equation. By Proposition 5 the set E(r) contains its boundary, so E(r) must be closed.
The following Theorem summarizes the results required to carry the argument of Section
6 without extra assumptions.
Theorem 3. Tangent curves. There is a unique tangent vector T(w) at any point
w 2 @E(r)nN: Also, the curve C that solves equation (21) from initial conditions (w;T(w))
coincides with the boundary of E(r) in a neighborhood of w:
Proof. The proof goes in two steps. First, we show that the curve C cannot go outside the
boundary of the set E(r) in a neighborhood of w: Otherwise, by altering initial conditions
slightly, we would be able to nd a curve C0 that solves equation (21) and cuts through
the boundary of the set E(r) as shown in Figure 14. Lemma 1 shows that this leads to a
contradiction. From the rst step we also conclude that the tangent vector is unique at any
point w 2 @E(r)nN: If the tangent vector was not unique then a tangent solution would
go outside the set. Second, we show that the curve C does not enter the interior E(r):
Otherwise, we would be able construct PPE that achieves a value pair outside E(r); as
shown in Lemma 2. Throughout the analysis, we use the fact that we can adjust solutions








Figure 14: Constructing a curve that cuts through E(r):
Suppose that the curve C has parts outside the set E(r): Then, by adjusting initial
conditions slightly, we can draw a curve C0 that also solves the optimality equation and
cuts through a small portion of the boundary of E(r); as shown in Figure 14. The left panel
shows that when the set E(r) has a kink at w; we can nd C0 by moving initial conditions
35inside the set. The right panel shows that when the set E(r) has a unique tangent at w;
we can draw C0 from the same point w but with a rotated angle.
Lemma 1 shows that it is impossible to have a curve that cuts through a small portion17
of the boundary of E(r) near a point w 2 @EnN:
Lemma 1. A solution C0 of the optimality equation with endpoints vL; vH 2 @E(r) cannot
pass through the interior of E(r); as shown on Figure 15 if
(i) there is a unit vector N0 such that for any x > 0; vL+xN0 = 2 E(r) and vH+xN0 = 2 E(r):












Figure 15: Impossible Curve.
Proof. Suppose such curve C0 existed. Then there must be a PPE that achieves any point
W0 strictly between the curve C0 and the boundary of the set E(r): Denote by Wt the
continuation values in this PPE. We will show that such PPE is impossible.
Let T0 be a unit vector orthogonal to N0: Let us introduce a rectangular coordinate
system based on these vectors. Let (;f()) be a parameterization of C0 between points vL
and vH in these coordinates. Let
Dt = N
0  Wt   f(T
0  Wt)
until a stopping time  when Wt hits the curve C0: Observe that D0 > 0:
17If w 2 @EnN and the portion of the boundary where C cuts through is suciently small, then conditions
(i) and (ii) of the Lemma hold.
36We will show that until time ; Dt has either positive volatility or positive drift. Also,
at moments of discontinuous public randomization, Dt increases in expectation. These
statements (together with appropriate technical conditions) imply that Dt can become
arbitrarily large, so continuation values would escape from the set E(r): This leads to a
contradiction.
To nish the proof of the Lemma, suppose that the volatility of Dt is zero and let us
show that it must have positive drift. Then the volatility of Wt is parallel to the curve
C0 at point v given by coordinates (T0  Wt;f(T0  Wt)): Denote by T and N the unit
tangent and normal vectors at that point on the curve C0 respectively. Then, ignoring
public randomization (which only makes Dt increase in expectation),
dWt = r(Wt   g(At)) dt + Tt dZt;
where t enforces action pair At on tangent T: By Proposition 4, the trajectories of con-
tinuation values have natural curvature
 =
2(Wt   g(At))  N
rjtj2 >
2(v   g(At))  N
rjtj2  max
a2A(T)nAN




This implies that the drift of Dt is positive.
Next, we need to prove that a solution to the optimality equation that is tangent to the
boundary of E(r) at an arbitrary point w 2 @E(r)nN does not enter the interior of E(r);
denoted by E(r):
Lemma 2. Tangent curves do not enter E(r): Consider point w 2 @E(r)nN with an
outward unit normal vector N: Then the curve C; which solves equation (21) from initial
conditions (w;N); lies completely outside or on the boundary of the set E(r): It does not
enter the interior of E(r):
Proof. Suppose there is v 2 C\E(r); as shown in Figure 16. We will show how to construct
a curve C0 with two endpoints vL;vR 2 E(r) and a point W0 = 2 E(r) between them.
Take a neighborhood N around point v in the interior of E(r): Without loss of general-
ity, assume that point v is found by moving in the clockwise direction from point w along
the curve C; as shown in Figure 6. Let us choose a normal vector N0 by rotating N in the
counterclockwise direction. Consider the curve C0 that solves the optimality equation from
initial conditions (w;N0): From the continuity of solutions of the optimality equation in
initial conditions, if N0 is suciently close to N; then the curve C0 will enter the neighbor-
hood N of v: Because N0 is rotated counterclockwise relative to N; the curve C0 will pass
above the line Pw tangent to E(r) at w; before it enters neighborhood N: Because there a
unique tangent line Pw at point w; as argued earlier, the curve C0 will enter the interior of
E(r) in the counterclockwise direction from w: Therefore, we can choose W0 = 2 E(r) that is
between points vL and vR 2 E(r) on the curve C0; as shown in Figure 6. By Proposition 5,
there is a PPE that achieves the value pair W0; so W0 2 E(r); a contradiction. We conclude












Figure 16: Proof of Lemma 2.
We also need to prove one last fact that we used several times during the proof and in
Section 6.
Lemma 3. (Solutions of the Optimality Equation). Solutions of the optimality
equation (21) exist locally and are continuous in initial conditions whenever the right hand
side of (21) is positive.
Proof. Consider initial conditions (w0;T0): Existence and continuity in w0 follows because
the right hand side of (21) is Lipschitz continuous in w: This is true because
Ha(w;T) =
2 (g(a)   w)  N
rj(a;T)j2
is continuously dierentiable in w for all a that are enforceable on tangent T; and  =
maxa2A(T)nAN Ha(w;T): H(w;T) may be discontinuous in T when some action becomes
unenforceable as we change the tangential angle. Nevertheless, continuity in T0 follows
from the continuity in w0 when the right hand side of (21) is strictly positive.
This concludes the proof of the Theorem.
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